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This study examines if the ﬂow rate from open unemployment
to labor market programs aﬀect the labor-force participation rate.
This question is relevant because Swedish labor-force participation is
expected to decline due to the age distribution in the population. A
new dataset, with monthly data for Swedish municipalities between
1991:08 and 2002:10, has been constructed. The results show that
increased probability of moving from open unemployment to labor
market programs has positive eﬀects on the labor-force participation
rate. Positive eﬀects are found for diﬀerent age groups. The esti-
mated eﬀect of the ﬂow rate from open unemployement into labor
market programs is countercyclical. The participation rate is pro-
cyclical, and counter-cyclical labor market programs could be used
to prevent discouraged workers from leaving labor force. The eﬀects
of ﬂow rates from programs to open unemployment, and from the
job destruction rate are negative, as expected. Income and labor
market tightness have positive eﬀects, except for older participants.
This is because is a spurios negative correlation in data for the older
participants. In general, the long run levels are achieved after about
nine years, and most of the adjustment takes place during the ﬁrst
four years.
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Few studies try to answer the question of whether labor market programs
aﬀect labor-force participation. This question is important in Sweden
because the labor force is expected to decline due to the age distribution in
the population. Today, there is a considerable focus on ways of attracting
groups outside the labor force into it, for example recipients of social
beneﬁts, immigrants, and young people who have weak links with the
labor market. Ways of retaining older workers in the labor force and
attracting people who have left labor force for some reason have also been
discussed. Labor market programs could be a factor in attracting new
entrants and preventing participants from leaving the labor force.
Normally, studies of the eﬀects of labor market programs use micro-
data, and analyze the eﬀects on the participants’ future income or their
probability of getting a job, see the overview by Calmfors, Forslund, and
Hemstr¨ om (2002). Studies using macro-data are more rare, and results
for Sweden indicate that the displacement eﬀect or direct crowding out
could be relatively large, see for example Dahlberg and Forslund (1999).
Results from reduced-form estimations indicate that programs reduce reg-
ular employment, see for example Calmfors and Skedinger (1995).
Here, the focus is on labor-force participation. It is important for the
overall performance of the labor market that movements in and out of the
labor force involve as little frictions as possible. In Sweden, labor-force
participation is pro-cyclical, so people tend to leave labor force when it
is diﬃcult to ﬁnd a job and to enter labor force when it is easy to ﬁnd a
job. In other words, the discouraged worker eﬀe c ti sp r e s e n t .I ti sn o ta
problem if participants move in and out of labor force when the business
cycle changes. During the long period with extremely high unemployment
rates in the early years of the 1990s, there was some fear that long-term
unemployed might be so discouraged that they dropped out of the labor
force permanently. Programs could be used to counteract the business-
cycle variation in labor-force participation, and perhaps to prevent people
from leaving labor force permanently.
Results in earlier studies indicate that labor market programs may
have positive eﬀects on labor-force participation in Sweden. This ques-
tion has not been studied so much internationally. Essay I in Johansson
(2006) ﬁnds a relatively large and positive eﬀect of labor market programs
on labor-force participation. If the number of participants in programs
IFAU–Do labor market ﬂows aﬀect labor-force participation? 3is increased by 100 the number of participants in labor force is increased
by 70 persons. The positive eﬀect in Dahlberg and Forslund (1999) is
obtained indirectly from their estimations of the displacement eﬀects of
labor market programs. These two studies use panel data for the Swedish
municipalities. Positive eﬀects are also found in studies using Swedish
time-series data, (Wadensj¨ o (1993) and Johansson and Markowski (1995)).
These studies estimate the eﬀect on labor-force participation from an in-
creased stock of participants in labor market programs.
In this paper, I have constructed a new dataset, with monthly data
for the Swedish municipalities from August 1991 to October 2002. The
relatively large number of observations in the time-dimension makes it
possible to estimate both the long run eﬀect and the short run dynamics.
Data for monthly employment and income at the municipality level are
constructed in a new way. Existing data measure employment in Novem-
ber only, and the measure of income refers to the yearly income for those
employed in November. Other papers study whether the number of par-
ticipants in labor market programs increases the number of participants
in labor force. This paper instead asks if an increased ﬂow of persons from
open unemployment into labor market programs increases labor-force par-
ticipation.
The ﬂow rate from open unemployment to labor market programs is a
more interesting policy-variable, because it can be controlled more directly
by policy makers, than the stock of program participants. Stocks can only
be controlled indirectly, by changing the inﬂow or the average program
duration. A typical policy question like ”What happens to labor-force
participation if we move people from open unemployment into program
participation?” can be answered when the empirical model is formulated
in ﬂow terms. The policy experiment in the present paper is diﬀerent
from that in Essay I in Johansson (2006), who study the eﬀect on labor-
force participation of an increased number of participants in labor market
programs. In this paper, the question is how labor-force participation is
aﬀected by increased ﬂow rates between open unemployment and labor
market programs.
2T h e o r e t i c a l m o d e l
This section presents a theoretical model for labor force determination.
The model is used to determine which variables should be included in the
4I F A U – D o l a b o r m a r k e t ﬂows aﬀect labor-force participation?estimation and to determine their expected eﬀects on labor-force partici-
pation. An individual will participate if the value of participating in labor
force is larger than the value of non-participation. Participants in labor
force could be employed, open unemployed or participate in a labor market
program. Non-participants are for example students, part-time pensioner,
or people that for other reasons chose to stay outside the labor force.
2.1 The model
The theoretical model is a search model with endogenously determined
labor-force participation, based on Calmfors and Lang (1995), Holmlund
and Lind´ en (1993), and Pissarides (1990). The same model is used in
Essay I in Johansson (2006). In the model, the labor-force participation
decision is based on a comparison between the value of participation and
non-participation. Labor force participants can ﬂow between three diﬀer-
ent labor market states. The factors determining the ﬂows between the
states are described, and the discounted values of being in each state are
calculated. The parameter restrictions needed to ensure that regular em-
ployment is preferred to other states are presented before the eﬀects on
the labor-force participation rate are calculated. The theoretical model is
slightly reformulated to correspond to the empirical measures available.
2.1.1 The states and ﬂows in the labor market
Figure 1 d e s c r i b e ss t a t e sa n dﬂows in the labor market. The number of
persons in each state is expressed in terms of the working-age population,
and the population is assumed to be ﬁxed. Labor force participants may
be employed, e, openly unemployed, u, or participating in labor market
programs, r, and e + u + r = 1. The states and the ﬂows for participants
are the same as in Holmlund and Lind´ en (1993). Non-participants ﬂow in
and out from the labor force via open unemployment. The instantaneous
ﬂow rates in and out from non-participation depend on the realization
of η and they are denoted ψ and ξ, respectively. It is assumed that all
non-participants who want to participate in labor force have to be openly
unemployed job seekers before moving to employment. This assumption
is relaxed in the empirical analysis.
The job separation rate is denoted φ and represents exogenously given
negative shocks to ﬁrms that result in reduced regular employment. A
fraction (1 − µ) of the number of persons that are separated from a job
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Figure 1: The states and ﬂows in the labor market
6I F A U – D o l a b o r m a r k e t ﬂows aﬀect labor-force participation?become unemployed, and a fraction µ is placed in a program. The proba-
bility of entering a program if openly unemployed is γ, and the probability
of becoming unemployed after program participation is λ.
The ﬁrms are creating vacancies, and the openly unemployed and par-
ticipants in labor market programs search for vacant jobs.1 The number
of matches depends on the number of vacancies and on the number of
searchers, that is, the number of openly unemployed and participants in
labor market programs. Increased labor market tightness, θ,( t h en u m b e r
of vacancies divided by the number of searchers) increases the probability
of getting a job oﬀer, α(θ).2
The probability of getting a job diﬀers between the unemployed and
the participants in labor market programs; the c parameter captures this
diﬀerence. If c is greater than one, labor market programs have positive
eﬀects on the job-oﬀer probability for the program participants compared
to the openly unemployed. If c is less than one, program participants
have smaller chances of getting a job oﬀer than the openly unemployed.
One reason could be that program participants search less than openly
unemployed.
2.1.2 The labor-force participation decision
People in the working-age population choose to participate in the la-
bor force if the value of participating is greater than the value of non-
participation. More people will participate in the labor force if the value
of participation is increased. When out of labor force, non-participants
beneﬁt from for example the value of leisure, the value of education or the
value of other activities they are engaged in. Working hours are assumed
to be ﬁxed, so only full-time jobs are considered.3
1There is no on-the-job search in the model.
2To see this, assume that the number of hirings is determined by h = h(s,v)=
h(cr+u,v). The number of eﬀective searchers, s = cr+u, and the number of vacancies,
v, increase the matching function. Assume that all hirings come from the stock of
searchers, h = αs = α(cr + u). Then, the job oﬀer arrival rate is α = h/s = h(s,v)/s.
If constant returns to scale are assumed for the h-function, we can express the job oﬀer
probability α as a function of labor market tightness, θ = v/s. With constant returns
to scale α = h(s,v)/s = h(1,v/s)=h(1,θ)=α(θ), where θ = v/s is the labor market
tightness. The job-oﬀer probability α is increasing with labor market tightness θ.
3The reason for not allowing labor force participants to vary their labor supply is
that data on the number of hours worked are not available in the dataset, so we cannot
empirically distinguish between full-time and part-time workers.
IFAU–Do labor market ﬂows aﬀect labor-force participation? 7The value of non-participation, δΛnp,i, consists of two parts: (1) f(z),
that describes the impacts of variables outside the theoretical model, for
example age, number of children and the supply of day-care services; (2)
and ηi, a stochastic shock to preferences, which is uniformly distributed
between ηmin and ηmax. δ is the discount factor. The value of non-
participation for an individual is
δΛnp,i = f(z)+ηi. (1)
ηi is the realization of the individual-speciﬁc shock. The labor force
participant who is indiﬀerent between labor-force participation and non-
participation has δΛnp,i = δΛu, where Λu is the value of being an unem-
ployed job searcher and δ the discount factor. In the theoretical model, it
is assumed that all non-participants who want to participate in labor force
have to be openly unemployed job seekers before moving to employment.4
The cut-oﬀ value, η∗, for the marginal participant is given by
η∗ = δΛu − f(z). (2)
The participation rate is the integral of the density function for η up to









The participation rate is the proportion of the working age population
that has a value of ηi up to η∗. Substitute the expression for η∗ in equation
(1) in equation (3) to express the participation rate as a function of the




δΛu − f(z) − ηmin
ηmax − ηmin
. (4)
The participation rate depends positively on the discounted value of
being a job seeker, δΛu. The eﬀect of f(z) on the participation rate is
assumed to be negative5. To summarize, the model predicts that the
4This assumption is relaxed in the empirical analysis.
5If Λu and f(z) contain the same variables, it is assumed that the positive eﬀect of
variables in Λu is small in relation to the negative eﬀect of f(z). In a model with an
endogenously determined value of leisure, the value of leisure depends on parameters in
the utility function. The value of leisure will be an increase in wealth; a variable that
8I F A U – D o l a b o r m a r k e t ﬂows aﬀect labor-force participation?participation rate increases in the same variables that increase the value
of being an unemployed job seeker, Λu.
2.1.3 The value of the states for labor force participants
The discounted value of the diﬀerent states (employment, δΛe, open un-
employment, δΛu, and program participation, δΛr) is computed as the
discounted income in each state - accounting for the probability of chang-
ing state and the income in the new state.
δΛe =[ w +( 1− µ)φ(Λu − Λe)+µφ(Λr − Λe)] (5)
δΛr =[ ρrw + cα(Λe − Λr)+λ(Λu − Λr)] (6)
δΛu =[ ρuw + α(Λe − Λu)+γ (Λr − Λu)] (7)
Employed workers earn w and the conditional probabilities of open
unemployment or participation in a program are (1 − µ)φ and µφ.P a r -
ticipants in labor market programs earn ρrw and they become employed
or openly unemployed with probabilities cα and λ. Openly unemployed
earn ρuw, and they become employed or placed in a labor market pro-
gram with probabilities α and γ. Equations (5)-(7) are used to calculate
the value of the states for labor force participants.6
could be aﬀected by the same variables as Λu. It is assumed that possible eﬀects of
wealth are small.
6The expression for the values of the states are the following:
Λe = w(δ∆)
−1 {[φ((1 − µ)(δ + cα)+λ)]ρu +[ φ(µ(α + δ)+γ)]ρr +
+δ[δ + α(c +1 )+γ + λ]+α[λ + c(γ + α)]}
Λr = w(δ∆)
−1 {[δ(γ + δ + α + φ)+φ(γ + µα)]ρr +
+[φ(λ + cα(1 − µ)) + δλ]ρu + α[c(α + δ + γ)+λ]}
Λu = w(δ∆)
−1 {[(δ + φ + λ + cα)δ + φ(c(1 − µ)α + λ)]ρu +
+[φ(γ + µα)+δγ]ρr +[ δ + c(γ + α)+λ]α}
where ∆ =( δ + cα + λ)(δ + φ + α)+γ (δ + φ + cα)+( 1− c)αµφ.
IFAU–Do labor market ﬂows aﬀect labor-force participation? 9An unemployed person accept job oﬀers if the value of employment is
greater than or equal to the value of being unemployed, Λe > Λu. The
condition is:
µφ(ρr − ρu) 6 γ (1 − ρr)+( δ + λ + cα)(1− ρu)( 8 )
This condition is likely to be satisﬁed for normal parameter values,
where ρu 6 ρr 6 1, because µφ,t h eﬂow rate from employment to labor
market programs, is small compared to the other rates in the expression.
Furthermore, the diﬀerence (ρr − ρu) is presumably smaller than (1 − ρr)
and (1 − ρu). If the levels of the replacement rates are restricted, so that
the replacement rate is the same for program participants and openly
unemployed, ρr = ρu = ρ, the condition in (8) is satisﬁed if ρ 6 1.
Program participants accept a job oﬀer if the value of employment
is greater than the value of participating in a program, Λe > Λr.T h e
condition is:
φ(1 − µ)(ρr − ρu) 6 (α + γ + δ)(1− ρr)+λ(1 − ρu)( 9 )
This condition is likely to be satisﬁed for realistic values of the replace-
ment rates, ρu 6 ρr 6 1, because the ﬂow rate from employment to open
unemployment, φ(1 − µ), has to be smaller than the sum of the ﬂow from
open unemployment to employment, α,t h eﬂows rates between unemploy-
ment and program participation, γ and λ, and the discount factor, δ.T h e
condition could be violated if the diﬀerence between the replacement rates
is large enough. For the special case when ρr = ρu = ρ, the condition in
(9) is satisﬁed if ρ 6 1.If ρu <ρ r = 1, the condition in (9) is satisﬁed if
φ(1 − µ) 6 λ, so the ﬂow from employment into unemployment must be
s m a l l e rt h a no re q u a lt ot h eﬂow from programs into unemployment.
An unemployed person accepts a place in a program if the value of
participation in a program is greater than the value of being openly un-
employed, Λr > Λu. The condition is:
(φ + δ)(ρr − ρu) > α((1 − ρr) − c(1 − ρu)) (10)
When ρr = ρu < 1, the condition in (10) is satisﬁed if c > 1. The
parameter c captures all diﬀerences in the probability of getting a job-
oﬀer between program participants and openly unemployed. The job-oﬀer
probability for program participants has to be at least as large as for
openly unemployed, because the replacement rates, and therefore income,
10 IFAU–Do labor market ﬂows aﬀect labor-force participation?are the same. On the other hand, if c<1, program participants have to
be compensated for the reduced probability of getting a job, so ρr >ρ u.
Involuntary ﬂows from unemployment to programs could be observed, be-
cause unemployed people could be forced to participate in programs in
order to retain their beneﬁts. In such cases, the self-selection constraint
in (10) is not fulﬁlled. Note that if programs are used to qualify the un-
employed for new periods of unemployment beneﬁts, it would increase the
value of Λr, and relax the constraint in (10). This eﬀect of programs is not
included in the model. Taken together, the self-selection constraints imply
that Λe > Λr > Λu. Restrictions on the policy parameters, λ,γ,µ,ρr,a n d
ρu are needed to satisfy the selection constraints.
2.1.4 Reformulation of the model to correspond to empirical
measures
The labor-force participation rate depends positively on the value of be-
ing a job seeker, Λu, see equation (4), implying that new participants
enter open unemployment. Empirically, we observe ﬂows between non-
participation and all three states of labor-force participation. Unfortu-
nately, data do not cover all job seekers, only unemployed persons who
a r er e g i s t e r e da ta ne m p l o y m e n to ﬃce are covered.
The theoretical model could be slightly reformulated to correspond
to the empirical measures. Let the cutoﬀ value, in (2), be η∗ = δΛe −
f(z), then the participant who is indiﬀerent between participation and
non-participation has δΛnp = δΛe, -i no t h e rw o r d st h ev a l u eo fn o n -
participation is equal to the value of employment. The new entrants could
then enter regular employment. For the purposes of of the model in this
paper, it does not matter which state non-participants enter, because the
values of the diﬀerent states react in the same direction to the same shock,
see Table 1.
2.2 The eﬀects on the labor-force participation rate
The way in which the values of the states in the labor market and the
participation rate are aﬀected by changes in the model’s parameter is
d i s p l a y e di nT a b l e1 .Λe, Λr, Λe are the discounted values of the expected
income in the diﬀerent states for labor force participants, employment,
labor market programs, and open unemployment.
IFAU–Do labor market ﬂows aﬀect labor-force participation? 11Table 1: Eﬀects on the values of the diﬀerent states and on the labor-force
participation rate
Increase in Eﬀect on
Λu Λr Λe partic.
rate
w, wage + + + +
ρr,ρ u, replacement rates + + + +
γ,r a t eu to r +++ + i f Λr − Λu > 0
λ,r a t er to u --- - i f Λr − Λu > 0
µ,s h a r ef r o me to r +++ + i f Λr − Λu > 0
c,r e l a t i v ee ﬀ of program + + + + if Λe − Λr > 0
φ,r a t ef r o me to u and r --- - i f ρr,ρ u 6 1
α(θ), rate from u and r to e +++ +
An increase in wages, w, increases the value of participation and thus
increases labor-force participation. ρr and ρu are the replacement rates
(income as a fraction of earnings) during program participation or un-
employment. Higher replacement rates increase the value of labor-force
participation in the same way as higher wages.
Increased inﬂows into programs, γ, and increased shares of laid-oﬀ
workers who enter directly into labor market program, µ,h a v ep o s i t i v e
eﬀects on labor-force participation if the value of participating in a pro-
gram is larger than being openly unemployed, that is, if Λr − Λu > 0.
And increased outﬂow rates from programs into unemployment, λ, have
negative eﬀects if Λr − Λu > 0.
The self-selection constraint, Λr − Λu > 0, in (10) is fulﬁlled if the
income for program participants is larger than for openly unemployed.
This has been the case for some programs. Often, participants in job-
creation programs are paid more than the unemployment beneﬁt, while
participants in training programs receive the unemployment beneﬁt. If the
income for unemployed and program participants is the same, labor-force
participation is increased if c > 1, so that program participants have a
greater probability of getting a job then open unemployed persons.7 The
parameter c could decrease during participation in some programs. It is,
7Remember that c captures all diﬀerences in job-oﬀer probabilities between openly
unemployed, and participants in labor market programs.
12 IFAU–Do labor market ﬂows aﬀect labor-force participation?for example, natural to terminate a training program before searching for
a new job. Naturally, the time left for job search is less when partici-
pating in full-time programs. If c<1, the program’s participants have
to be compensated by a larger income compared with the openly unem-
ployed.8 Furthermore, if programs are used to qualify for new periods of
unemployment beneﬁts, the value of programs relative to open unemploy-
ment increases, and the restriction, Λr − Λu > 0, is eased. The selection
constraint Λr − Λu > 0h a st ob ef u l ﬁlled in order to determine the sign
of the eﬀect on labor-force participation from increased probabilities of
moving between open unemployment and labor market programs, γ and
λ.I f l a i d - o ﬀ workers have an increased probability of participating in a
program instead of becoming openly unemployed - an increase in the pa-
rameter µ in the model - the labor-force participation rate will increase if
Λr − Λu > 0.
I nt h em o d e l ,a ni n c r e a s ei nt h er e l a t i v ee ﬀectiveness of programs, c,
directly increases the probability of moving from programs to employment.
If c increases, the participation rate is expected to increase, if Λe−Λr > 0
because the probability of ﬁnding a job and receiving a higher income has
increased. The condition, Λe − Λr > 0, is likely to be fulﬁlled for normal
parameter values, see the discussion of equation (9).
Labor market tightness, θ =( v/(u + cr)), the number of vacancies di-
vided by the number of eﬀective job-searchers, aﬀects the ﬂow rates from
unemployment and labor market programs into regular employment. An
increased number of vacancies, v, increases the probability of ﬁnding a
job and is expected to have a positive eﬀect on labor-force participation.
Increased numbers of openly unemployed persons, u, or program partici-
pants, r, increase the number of persons searching for jobs and, for a given
number of vacancies and a given relative eﬀectiveness of programs, c, it is
now more diﬃcult to ﬁnd a job. The job-oﬀer probability, α(θ), depends
on labor market tightness, (θ), which gives rise to the discouraged-worker
eﬀect in the model because labor market tightness is pro-cyclical.
An increased job separation rate, which is a negative employment
shock, φ, increases the probability of being openly unemployed. This
is expected to have a negative eﬀect on the labor-force participation rate
because the probability of recieving a reduced income has increased since
unemployment beneﬁts are lower than wages.
8Of course, the compensation could be a combination of higher expected probability
of getting a job oﬀer and an anticipated higher wage after the program.
IFAU–Do labor market ﬂows aﬀect labor-force participation? 13To summarize, we expect the following variables to aﬀect labor-force
participation rate: the wage, w, the replacement rates, ρr and ρu, the
ﬂow rates from open unemployment to programs, γ, and from programs
to open unemployment, λ, the share of negative employment shocks to
program, µ, the relative eﬀectiveness of programs, c,t h eﬂow rates from
employment to open unemployment, (1 − µ)φ, and from employment to
program, µφ,a n dt h eﬂow rate from open unemployment to employment,
α(θ).
3D a t a
The data are a panel of monthly observations between August 1991 and
October 2002 for Swedish municipalities. The number of observations is
284 × 135 = 38 340. Data on income and employment are new and com-
piled on a monthly basis. The alternative is the existing data in Rams9.
Unfortunately, Rams measures employment in November only, and in-
come for those employed in November is their yearly income and not their
income in November.
The H¨ andel database from the National Labour Board, available at
IFAU, contains information on all individuals who are registered at an
employment oﬃce as job searchers. H¨ andel is used to calculate the gross
ﬂows between unemployment and labor market programs, and to com-
pute the stock of the number of persons who are openly unemployed or
participating in labor market programs.
3.1 The new data
Data on individual employment and income are calculated from a register
of the tax authorities’ statement of income10.D a t ao ni n c o m ef r o md i ﬀer-
ent employers are available, for every individual. Income and the ﬁrst and
the last month the income is paid out are recorded, for every employer.
Monthly data on income are calculated on the assumption that the income
is evenly distributed on a monthly basis. For each individual, the total
income is calculated as the sum of the monthly distributed income from
9The employment register at Statistics Sweden.
10The ﬁrms have to send a statement of income for each employee to the tax authori-
ties. The statement contains the income and the initial and ﬁnal month for the payment
period, together with the identiﬁcation number for the plant, the Cfar-number.
14 IFAU–Do labor market ﬂows aﬀect labor-force participation?all income statements. To classify the individual as employed or not, a
lower limit for the income is used. If the income is lower than the cutoﬀ
value, the individual is classiﬁed as non-employed.11 The cut-oﬀ value
that is used here is 75 % of the wage for a male cleaner employed in the
municipality sector.12 Self-employed persons with an income of more than
SEK 100 per month are deﬁned as employed. Statements of income for
self-employed persons do not contain information on the starting and end-
ing month, so the income for self-employed persons is distributed evenly
over the whole year.
The cutoﬀ here is relatively high, but still at the bottom of the income
distribution range. The same cutoﬀ value is used for employees of all ages.
It turns out that using the same income cutoﬀ works surprisingly well. I
have calculated the number of employed persons in diﬀerent age groups
using the same implicit income cutoﬀ as in Rams 1998 for all persons em-
ployed.13 The correspondence between the numbers of persons in diﬀerent
age groups is very close to the number of persons employed according to
Rams. This is surprising because a sophisticated model is used in Rams
to determine the income cutoﬀ value. The correspondence with Rams is
less for older people. For example, when calculating employment for men
and women separately, for the 55-59 and 60-64 age groups, the diﬀerences
were relatively large compared with Rams. But if, instead, employment
for men and women were calculated for the 55-64 age group, the number
of employed persons comes very close to Rams.
There is seasonal variation in the employment data, with higher em-
ployment, for example, during the summer months. Both employment
and income increase dramatically in January each year. The increase in
January is due to a cohort eﬀect, arising from the fact that age is mea-
sured yearly and the other variables are measured monthly. The cohort
eﬀect is largest for the 55-64 age group, and the seasonal variation is more
pronounced for persons in the 18-64 age range.
The calculations of monthly employment and income are based on
11Non-employed persons could be openly unemployed, participating in a labor market
program, or out of labor force.
12The cut-oﬀ in 2002 is SEK 11 477.
13The implicit cutoﬀ value used in calculating November employment by Statistic
Sweden is SEK 2 275 in November 1998. The employment deﬁnition used by Statistics
Sweden should correspond to the labor force survey deﬁnition, i.e. those who have
worked one hour every week are employed. The cutoﬀ value that is used here for 1998
is SEK 6 600 per month.
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income are correct and that income should be equally distributed across
the months. One disadvantage is that the computation of employment has
to rely on a cutoﬀ-value for income. The same person could be classiﬁed
as both employed and unemployed or in a program, if the income for this
person is above the cutoﬀ value and if the individual is registered in H¨ andel
during the same period.
3.2 Variables in the estimation
The theoretical model in Section 2 suggests that the following variables
should aﬀect labor-force participation rate: the wage, w,t h eﬂow rates
between the diﬀerent states, γ, λ, φ, and α(θ), the share of the job sepa-
ration rate that goes to program, µ,t h er e l a t i v ee ﬀectiveness of programs,
c, and the replacement rates, ρr ρu. This section presents the empirical
deﬁnition of the variables. The expected eﬀects of the empirical variables
are indicated in Table 2.
The labor force is calculated as the sum of employed, openly unem-
ployed and participants in labor market programs. Employment is the
sum of the number of persons classiﬁed as employed in each municipality.
Non-participants are the working-age population in the age range 18-65,
excluding people in the labor force. With this deﬁnition, all participants
in labor market programs are in the labor force. The population in each
municipality is measured in December. The labor-force participation rate,
lf, is labor force divided by population in December of the previous year.
The wage is measured by the monthly labor income for those employed,
inc. Increased income is expected to increase labor-force participation.
The ﬂow rates between open unemployment and labor market programs,
[u → r]a n d[ r → u], are measured by the gross ﬂow between the states,
divided by the lagged number of persons in the outﬂow stock. Inﬂow into
programs is expected to increase participation and outﬂow from programs
is expected to reduce labor-force participation.
In the theoretical model, the ﬂow rate from open unemployment and
labor market programs to employment α, should be a function of labor
market tightness, θ = v/(u + cr), the number of vacant jobs divided by
the number of eﬀective job-seekers, the stock of openly unemployed per-
sons, u, and the stock of program participants, r, multiplied by the eﬀec-
16 IFAU–Do labor market ﬂows aﬀect labor-force participation?tiveness parameter c.14 It is assumed that there is no diﬀerence between
unemployed persons and program participants as job-searchers, so c =1
in the computation.
Increased labor market tightness, teta, is expected to increase labor-
force participation. It is possible to compute the number of persons who
leave H¨ andel for employment, which could be an alternative measure. Un-
employment in the theoretical model refers to unemployed people who are
looking for jobs. Unemployment in H¨ andel is people who have registered
at an employment oﬃce. In reality, we see ﬂows from outside labor force
to employment, and this ﬂo ww i l ln o tb ec a p t u r e di fH ¨ andel data are used
to measure the inﬂow to employment. Labor market tightness is used
instead. The ﬂow from employment, job separations, is measured by the
job destruction rate, jdr. The number of destroyed jobs is deﬁned as the
absolute sum of negative employment changes in each employment unit.15
The job destruction rate is calculated by dividing job destruction with
lagged employment at each employment unit. The job destruction rate is
expected to have a negative eﬀect on the labor-force participation rate.
Data on replacement rates, which should aﬀect labor-force participa-
tion, are not available at the municipality level. The stocks are measured
at the end of each month and the ﬂow is measured during the month.
Table 2 summarizes the discussion of the empirical variables and their
expected eﬀect on the labor-force participation rate. Summary statistics
and plots of data are found in Appendix A.
3.3 The policy experiment
This paper focuses on the eﬀect of labor market programs on labor-force
participation, and the policy variable is the ﬂow from open unemployment
to labor market programs. Other possible measures of policies are the out-
ﬂow from programs to open unemployment, the number of participants in
programs, and replacement rates. These measures are not considered here,
either because they cannot be directly controlled by the local labor mar-
ket oﬃces (which are responsible for the implementation of the policy)
14The formulation of the labor market tightness variable implicitly assumes that there
is constant return to scale in the matching function. Results in Forslund and Johansson
(2006) indicate that the point-estimates of the scale elasticity vary but are normally
below one.
15Self-employed persons are excluded from the calculation. If a person has several
statements of income, the Cfar-number for the one with the largest income is used.
IFAU–Do labor market ﬂows aﬀect labor-force participation? 17Table 2: The empirical variables and the expected eﬀect on the labor-force
participation rate
Variable Deﬁnition Eﬀect
lf number of people in labor forcet/pop1865t−1
inc w, real monthly income for employedt +
[u → r] γ, ﬂow u to rt/stock ut−1 +
[r → u] λ, ﬂow r to ut/stock rt -
teta θ, tightness v/(u + r)+
jdr φ, job destruction rate -
or there are no good empirical measures for them. The ﬂow from open
unemployment into labor market programs can be controlled directly, be-
cause the labor market oﬃce decide which unemployed that should get
an oﬀer to participate in a labor market program. The outﬂow from pro-
grams into open unemployment is related to the duration of the programs
and could only be controlled indirectly. Furthermore, voluntary quits and
dropouts from programs occur. The disadvantage of using the number of
program participants as policy variables is that the stock depends on the
ﬂows between programs and the other states.
The stock of participants in programs shows up indirectly in the esti-
mation, as the denominator in the labor market tightness variable, teta,r e -
ﬂecting an indirect negative eﬀect of labor market programs in the model.
If, for a given number of vacancies, the number of job-searchers increases,
the competition for vacant jobs increases, resulting in a negative eﬀect on
labor force. Only the results of tightness will be discussed, and not the
separate eﬀect of vacancies and the number of job-searchers.
In the policy experiment, where the ﬂow from unemployment into pro-
grams is permanently increased, it is possible that the number of un-
employed persons goes to zero, and the number of participants in labor
market programs inﬁnitely large. Therefore, the results of this experiment
should be interpreted carefully, remembering that it only measures eﬀects
over the business cycle horizon. To carry out an experiment with results
that are valid in the long run, steady state or stock ﬂow equilibrium have to
be imposed. Necessary data to impose such restrictions are not available.
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A dynamic model is estimated. Both lagged eﬀects of the explanatory
variables and gradual adjustment in the dependent variables are allowed.
A relatively large number of lags are probably needed when monthly data
are used. All explanatory variables are assumed to be predetermined with
respect to labor-force participation. That is, they could be correlated with
contemporaneous and future values of the error term in the estimated
equation, but not with lagged values of labor-force participation. This
means that forecasts made today of future explanatory variables are not
allowed to aﬀect labor-force participation today.16. No attempt will be
made to estimate the contemporaneous eﬀects. Models are estimated for
participants in the 18-64 age range, with separate models for men and
women.
4.1 Estimation method
Panel data models are used, primarily because the number of observations
is then suﬃciently large to estimate both the short run adjustment and the
long run eﬀects. It is possible to estimate separate time-series models for
each municipality, avoiding the panel-data restriction of equal coeﬃcients
for the variables. But, on the other hand, the number of observations in
the individual time series model is too small to estimate the short run
dynamics with suﬃcient accuracy.17
The commonly used estimators for panel data models, for example the
within-group estimator, are not suitable when the variables are predeter-
mined, because strict exogeneity is required, if an individual speciﬁc term
is included.18 If T becomes large, the within-group estimator is consis-
tent for models with predetermined variables. Here it is assumed that the
number of observations in the time dimensions is suﬃciently large for con-
sistent estimation. This assumption is probably valid because the average
of the estimated long run eﬀects is the same if separate models for each
16The assumption is probably not problematical because it will normally take more
than a month for nonparticipants to adjust their behavior to changes in expectations
of the future labor market situation, for example.
17The dataset contains 135 monthly observations for 284 municipalities.
18Predetermined variables have to be transformed into ﬁrst diﬀerences or orthogonal
deviation. Lagged levels of the variables are valid instruments for the transformed
variables.
IFAU–Do labor market ﬂows aﬀect labor-force participation? 19municipality are estimated, as when the within group estimator is used.
4.2 Estimation results
Panel data models with lags in all variables are estimated for the labor-
force participation rate. Models are estimated for participants in the 18-
64 age range, with separate models for men and women. The estimated
results of models for participants in the 18-24, 25-39, 40-54, 55-64 and
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The coeﬃcients on the lagged level of the variables are the sum of
the coeﬃcients for each lag polynomial in the model, in levels, and the
coeﬃcients for the diﬀerence terms are functions of the original coeﬃcients
in the model, in levels. Prior to estimating, all variables are seasonally
adjusted using centered seasonal dummies. Separate seasonal models are
estimated for each municipality. Common time-speciﬁce ﬀects are removed
by estimating panel data models with time dummies for each seasonally
adjusted variable. Panel data models are then estimated using the within-
group estimator. There are 284 municipalities in the dataset, and together
with the 135 months between August 1991 and October 2002, the total
number of observations is 38 340.
All variables are measured at the municipality level, with the exception
of labor market tightness, teta, and the job destruction rate, jdr. Labor
market tightness, teta, is related to the probability of ﬁnding a job, and the
20 IFAU–Do labor market ﬂows aﬀect labor-force participation?job destruction rate, jdr, to the probability of losing a job. These variables
are measured at the local labor market level19, because local labor markets
reﬂect where most inhabitants in each municipality work. Labor market
programs are typically only oﬀered in the home municipality, so the ﬂows
between open unemployment and labor market programs, [u → r], and
[r → u] are measured at the municipality level. Income, inc,i sm e a s u r e d
as the average income for the employed person in each municipality, and
it reﬂects the actual income for diﬀerent jobs in the municipalities.
All models, including those for the separate age groups in Appendix
C, have the same lag length in the estimations, p = 7. This is the number
of lags where the tests, on average for the age groups, show less signiﬁcant
signs of correlation in the residuals. The estimated long run eﬀects are
not sensitive to how many lags are included in the models.
In general, the coeﬃcients for the lagged labor-force participation are
signiﬁcant and small, around 0.05, see Table 7 in Appendix B, where the
estimates of the coeﬃcients in front of the lagged levels of the variables
are presented. The models are estimated on the basis of monthly data, so
the relatively slow adjustment to the long run refers to months. The R2
values are low, around 0.05, probably reﬂecting the eﬀects of removal of
the common time dummies prior to estimation.
The estimated long run eﬀects20 a r ep r e s e n t e di nT a b l e3 .T h ep o i n t
estimates of income are imprecisely, and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. The point estimates are positive, as expected in the joint model
and in the male model, but negative in the model for women. The point
estimates of the eﬀects of the ﬂow rates into programs, [u → r], are pos-
itive, as expected. They are signiﬁcant in the separate models for men
and women, but insigniﬁcant in the joint model. The estimated eﬀects of
outﬂow, [r → u], from programs are negative, as expected, and signiﬁcant
in the joint and the female model but insigniﬁc a n ti nt h em a l em o d e l .T h e
estimated eﬀect of teta, labor market tightness, is positive and signiﬁcant
in all equations. The estimated eﬀect of the job destruction rate, jdr,
is negative, as expected, but only signiﬁcant in the equation for female
labor-force participation.
19The deﬁnition of local labor markets is based on commuting patterns. The number
of local labor markets is 100 and the number of municipalities is 284.
20The long run eﬀects are calculated from the coeﬃc i e n ta tt h el a g g e dl e v e lo ft h e
variables, divided by the coeﬃcient on the lagged level of the dependent variable with
reversed sign.
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Variable Eﬀect p-val p-val p-val
age group 18-64 = 0
inc 0.00038 0.368 - -
[u → r] 0.09474 0.186 - -
[r → u] -0.02369 0.003 - -
teta 0.08506 0.000 - -
jdr -0.45098 0.265 - -
men 18-64 = 0 = 18-64 = women
inc 0.00042 0.187 0.920 0.026
[u → r] 0.05427 0.051 0.144 0.011
[r → u] -0.01818 0.187 0.689 0.011
teta 0.03767 0.000 0.000 0.549
jdr -0.26575 0.458 0.603 0.166
women 18-64 = 0 = 18-64 = men
inc -0.00043 0.467 0.170 0.149
[u → r] 0.12468 0.000 0.317 0.019
[r → u] -0.05320 0.004 0.111 0.058
teta 0.04285 0.000 0.000 0.527
jdr -0.76331 0.054 0.431 0.210
Note: Seasonally adjusted monthly data for 284 municipalities, estimation
period 1992:7-2002:9, R2 = 0.051, the eﬀects of common time dummies are
removed prior to estimation. The within-group estimator is used. The col-
umn denoted ”p-val = 0” shows the p-value for the test of a zero long run
eﬀect. The column denoted ”p-val = 18-64” shows the p-value for a test of
the hypothesis that the estimated long run eﬀects are equal to the eﬀects for
all participants. The column denoted ”p-val=women” and ”p-val=men” shows
the p-value for tests of the hypothesis that the estimated long run eﬀects are
equal to the eﬀects for female and male participants, respectively. The p-values
are calculated using the delta-method.
The eﬀects in the male and the female models are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from the eﬀects in the joint model, except for the eﬀect of teta,
labor market tightness. The point estimate of teta is larger in the joint
model than in the separate models for men and women. The standard
errors for the eﬀects are low in all three equations. The estimated eﬀect
of teta for men and women is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the joint model
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the ﬂow rates to and from labor market programs, [u → r]a n d[ r → u],
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for men and women. The eﬀect of income for
m a l e si ss i g n i ﬁcantly diﬀerent from the insigniﬁcant and negative eﬀect
for women. The other eﬀects are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between men
and women.
To summarize the results so far, the long run eﬀects of income are
small and insigniﬁcant. The inﬂow rates into programs, [u → r], have the
expected positive eﬀects in all models, and the outﬂow rates, [r → u], have
the expected negative eﬀects. The estimated eﬀects of the labor market
tightness, teta, are positive, as expected. The estimated eﬀects of the job
destruction rate, jdr, are negative, as expected.
The point-estimate of jdr is relatively large, but not signiﬁcant. The
theoretical variable that is represented empirically by the job destruction
rate is negative employment shocks, causing ﬂows from employment to
unemployment. The number of destroyed jobs measures the extent to
which employment at the employment unit has decreased. The variable
does not contain direct information about how many individuals that have
left employment, which would have been a better measure here. Normally,
the worker ﬂows are larger than the job ﬂows. The job destruction rate is
an imperfect measure of negative employment shocks, and this is probably
one reason for the imprecise estimate of the eﬀects.
In order to examine whether the size of the estimated eﬀect of the ﬂow
rate between open unemployment and labor market programs, [u → r],
varies with the state of the business cycle, the long run eﬀect of the ﬂow
rate, [u → r], is interacted with the long run eﬀect of labor market tight-
ness, θ. The estimation is carried out for all participants in the 18-64 age
group. The coeﬃcient for the interaction term is signiﬁcant and negative.
That is, the positive eﬀect of inﬂow to labor market programs becomes
lower when the business cycle improve, and θ increases. In other words,
the size the estimated eﬀect of the ﬂow rate from open unemployment
into labor market programs, [u → r], is countercyclical, and the expected
eﬀect is larger in downturns.
Variables measured at diﬀerent local levels are used in the estimations.
This could give rise to a so-called Moulton bias, which generates a down-
ward bias in the estimated standard errors. To check for this possibility,
the model is estimated with the robust and cluster option in the Stata
software. Clustered standard errors are calculated both for the 100 local
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levels are only marginal, so the standard errors are probably not aﬀected
by the Moulton bias.
Table 4: P-values for joint tests of long-run eﬀects of programs and all
long-run eﬀects
joint test joint test
[u → r] and [r → u] all long run eﬀects
age groups eﬀ =0 e ﬀ =1 8 - 6 4 e ﬀ=0 eﬀ=18-64
18-64 0.012 - 0.000 -
18-64 m 0.086 0.338 0.000 0.000
18-64 w 0.000 0.262 0.000 0.000
Table 4 presents the p-values from Wald tests of the hypothesis that
the ﬂow rates from unemployment to programs, [u → r] and from pro-
grams to unemployment, [r → u]a r ej o i n t l ys i g n i ﬁcant. Tests of the joint
signiﬁcance of the long run eﬀect of all variables are also presented, to-
gether with the results from tests of the hypothesis that the joint eﬀects
diﬀer from the eﬀects for all participants in the 18-64 age range. The joint
eﬀects of the ﬂow rates into and out of labor market programs, [u → r],
[r − u], are signiﬁcant. The eﬀects for men and women are not signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from the eﬀect for 18-64 years old. The long run eﬀects
of all variables are jointly signiﬁcant and diﬀer signiﬁcantly for men and
women from the eﬀects for all participants.
Table 5 presents the long run results of an experiment where each
variable is increased by one standard deviation. The standard deviations
are largest for the job destruction rate (160%), and smallest for income
(10%).21 The standard deviations for the ﬂows between labor market
programs and open unemployment are relatively large, around 50% for all
participants. Even if the changes in the explanatory variables are relatively
large, the percentage eﬀects on the variables are small, reﬂecting the small
elasticities that are estimated. Still, the number of persons that could be
aﬀected is fairly large. According to the point estimate, around 18 000
persons enter the labor force when the inﬂow rate to programs increases
21Note that the job destruction rate, in contrast to the other variables, is expressed
in terms of employed persons in the 18-64 age range, and not for men and women
separately.
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on the number of participants in labor force of changes in the explanatory
variables by one standard deviation
Variable 18-64 18-64 18-64
men women
inc ∆% 9.8 9.5 10.4
∆lfr % (0.4) (0.5) (-0.4)
∆lf (14 773) (12 482) (-11 722)
[u → r] ∆% 49.1 46.3 53.6
∆lfr % (0.5 ) 0.3 0.8
∆lf (18 184) 4 984 12 725
[r → u] ∆% 46.5 41.7 53.5
∆lfr % -0.3 (-0.2) -0.8
∆lf -10 011 (-3 486) -12 820
teta ∆% 80.7 78.7 82.4
∆lfr % 0.5 0.4 0.7
∆lf 18 911 7 443 10 712
jdr ∆% 159.4 159.4 159.4
∆lfr % (1.9) (-1.0) -3.6
∆lf (-64 775) (-19 376) -53 981
Note: For each variable, the ﬁrst row shows the percentage increase, the
second row the percentage eﬀect on the labor-force participation rate, and the
third row the eﬀect in terms of the number of persons in labor force, assuming
that the population is constant, at the average level during the sample period.
Note that this experiment does not use steady state restrictions, so it should
not be allowed to go on forever.
by one standard deviation. Note, however, that the estimated eﬀect is
insigniﬁcant, and the result is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.





























































































































Response to permanent shocks
Figure 2: Response to permanent shocks, 18-64 age group
4.2.1 Short run dynamics
Figure 2 shows the graphs of the impulse-response functions for all par-
ticipants in the 18-64 age range. The impulse-response functions are plots
of the cumulative estimated eﬀects, using the moving average form of the
estimated models. The plots give a picture of the dynamic behavior in
the models. The short run adjustment patterns are shown together with
the adjustment time and the long run levels. The long run levels are the
same as the long run eﬀects in Table 3. The solid line is the response in
the labor-force participation rate for men and women, the dashed line for
men, and the dotted line for women.
First we can note that the long run levels are almost achieved after
110 months for all participants, so it takes around nine years to reach the
long run. For all participants, most of the adjustment (75%) take place
during the ﬁrst 45 month or four years. Even if the estimated adjustment-
coeﬃcients are small, around 0.05, the use of monthly data means that the
adjustment time is reasonable. Most of the responses to temporary shocks
26 IFAU–Do labor market ﬂows aﬀect labor-force participation?take place during the ﬁrst six months, because the independent variables
are included with seven lags. Remember that the results of experiments in
which the variables are increased permanently should be interpreted with
care, because no stock ﬂow equilibrium is imposed in the estimations. The
main point here is to show that the adjustment is reasonable, despite the
small adjustment coeﬃcient.
4.2.2 Comparisons with other studies
The result in this paper indicate positive eﬀect on labor-force participation
for increased ﬂow rate from open unemployment to labor market programs.
Other studies based on Swedish data, for example Essay I in Johansson
(2006), Dahlberg and Forslund (1999), Wadensj¨ o (1993) and Johansson
and Markowski (1995) have also found positive eﬀects on labor-force par-
ticipation of programs in Sweden. These studies use data on stocks, the
number of participants in labor market programs and in open unemploy-
ment as explanatory variables and not the ﬂows between the stocks.
The results from models based on ﬂows, cannot readily be compared
with the results from models estimated on stocks. To see this, consider the
experiment we are analyzing in this paper: ”What happens to labor-force
participation if we move 100 persons from open unemployment into labor
market programs?”.22 Exactly the same experiment could not be carried
out in a model estimated on stocks, because it is unclear which of the
underlying ﬂow rates cause the changes in the stocks when we decrease
the stock of openly unemployed persons by 100 and increase the stock
of program participants by 100. To see this, note that there are nine
ﬂows in the theoretical model that aﬀect unemployment and the number
of participants in labor market programs, see Figure 1. It is impossible
to check which ﬂows generate the changes in the stocks, and therefore it
is not possible to compare the estimation results. Likewise, the answer
to the question ”What happens to labor-force participation if we increase
the number of participants in labor market programs?” is straightforward
in models estimated on the basis of stocks, but problematic in models
estimated on ﬂo w s ,b e c a u s ew ed on o tk n o ww h i c hﬂows lie behind the
changes in the stocks.
The theoretical model shows how the stocks and ﬂows are related to
22The ﬂow in the experiment has to be converted into a rate. This could be done, for
example by using the average size of the stock during the sample period.
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the ﬂow rates23, see Figure 1, and the other parameters in the theoretical
model. Formally, this relationship could, for example, be used to deter-
mine how the stocks are aﬀected by the change in one of the ﬂows. To
do this, values have to be assigned to the level of the ﬂow rates and the
other parameters in the expression for the change in the stocks. The av-
erage ﬂow rates during the sample period could be used, together with
assumptions about the size of other parameters involved. However, this
could not be implemented because all ﬂow rates data are not available24.
So, even if we are prepared to accept the necessary approximations, it is
not possible to calculate the eﬀect implied on stocks using the theoretical
model, because data that have to be used in the approximation are not
available.
5 Summary and discussion
This study examine the question of whether the ﬂow rate from open un-
employment to labor market programs aﬀects the labor-force participation
rate. Models are estimated for participants in the 18-64 age range, and
with separate models for men and women.25 In general, the adjustment
time is reasonable, it takes around nine years to reach the long run level,
and most of the adjustment takes place within the ﬁrst three years. Almost
all long run eﬀects have the expected signs.
The long run eﬀect of income is positive, as expected, for all partic-
ipants. The estimated long run eﬀects of the ﬂow rates to labor market
programs from open unemployment are positive, as expected, and the ef-
fects of the ﬂow rates from programs to open unemployment are negative,
as expected. The estimated long run eﬀect of teta, labor market tightness
is positive, as expected, for all participants. The point estimates of the
job destruction rate are negative, as expected, but imprecisely estimated.
One reason could be that the job destruction rate is an imperfect measure
23Empirically, the number of ﬂo wr a t e si se l e v e n ,b e c a u s ei na n do u t ﬂow from em-
ployment and outﬂow from programs could take place.
24Data are missing on the two ﬂows between the non-participation state and employ-
ment, and on the four ﬂows from employment or non-participation to unemployment or
program participation.
25Estimation results for participants in the 18-24, 25-39, 40-54, 55-64, and 25-54 age
groups are found in Appendix C.
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In general, the estimated eﬀects and elasticities are small. But the esti-
mates indicate that the number of persons who may have entered the labor
force due to the increased ﬂow rate to programs is not negligible.26 The
dominant reason for variation in the labor-force participation rate during
the sample period is the job destruction rate. This eﬀect is imprecisely
estimated, however.
A ”discouraged worker eﬀect” occurs if labor force participants leave
labor force when it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd a job, and return when it is easy to
ﬁnd work. Empirically, this eﬀect is often estimated as a negative eﬀect
on labor-force participation due to increased open unemployment. Here,
unemployment has an indirect impact due to labor market tightness -
the number of vacant jobs divided by the total number of job-seekers.27
The estimated positive eﬀect of labor market tightness indicates that the
participation rate is pro-cyclical. The negative eﬀect of the discouraged
worker eﬀect can be counteracted by labor market programs. If programs
are counter-cyclical, they reduce the business cycle variation in the labor
force, and could perhaps prevent participants from leaving the labor force.
The size of the estimated eﬀect of the ﬂow rate from open unemployment
into labor market programs, [u → r], is countercyclical, so the expected
eﬀect is larger in downturns.
As may be recalled from the discussion in Section 3.3, an experiment in
which the ﬂow from open unemployment into labor market programs is in-
creased permanently could result in a situation were all job-seekers end up
as program participants. For practical purposes, the lack of steady-state
restrictions in the policy experiment, which is considered here, involving
changing the ﬂow rate from open unemployment into labor market pro-
grams, is not problematic. The normal size of a policy change is probably
less than one standard deviation, and the long run levels are reached after
nine years. Care should be taken if the experiment involves extremely
large changes in the ﬂow rates that last for a very long time.
The estimation show that an increased probability of moving openly
unemployed persons into labor market programs increases the labor-force
26The point estimates indicate that labor force could increase by 18 000 persons, if
the ﬂow rate from open unemployment into labor market programs is increased by one
standard deviation, (50%).
27Both unemployed and participants in labor market programs are included in the
total number of job-seekers.
IFAU–Do labor market ﬂows aﬀect labor-force participation? 29participation rate. The point estimate for the older participants, is lower,
but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the eﬀect for all participants. The re-
sults are robust over diﬀerent age groups. All ten estimates, (including
those presented in Appendix C), are positive, and two are insigniﬁcant.
Moreover, the estimated eﬀects of increased probability of entering a labor
market program are similar for the diﬀerent age groups. One should prob-
ably expect more diﬀerences when the diﬀerent situations for participants
in diﬀerent age-groups are taken into account.28
The positive eﬀects indicate that labor market programs could be used
to attract more people to participate in the labor force, or alternatively
to prevent people from leaving the labor force. It should be noted, that
the results cannot be interpreted as a policy recommended to increase
labor-force participation. This is so because the estimated eﬀects are only
partial, and no costs or indirect eﬀects have been taken into account in
the estimation.
As in Essay I in Johansson (2006), the eﬀects on labor supply are
probably over-estimated because labor market programs have been used
for qualiﬁcation for new periods of unemployment beneﬁts. And, the eﬀect
is measured for the ”nominal” labor force and not for the eﬀective labor
force because we do not know the search intensity for people who move in
and out from labor force.
28The only expectation is younger participants, where the adjustment time is shorter,
the eﬀect of income is larger, the eﬀect of the ﬂow rates to and from labor market
programs smaller, and the eﬀect of labor market tightness smaller, compared to the
other age groups.
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Table 6 presents summary statistics for the variables in the estimations for
the 18-64 age range. The total number of observations is 38 340, for 284
municipalities, and 135 monthly time periods, between 1991:08-2002:10.
The variation within the municipalities, (the deviation of each municipal-
ity observation from the mean over time in each municipality), is larger
than the variation between municipalities, (the deviation of the mean over
time in each municipality from the total mean), for the ﬂow rates between
open unemployment and labor market programs, [u → r], and [u → r],
and for labor market tightness, teta, implying that the time variation is
more important than the variation between municipalities for these vari-
a b l e s . T h ev a r i a t i o nb e t w e e na n dw i t h i na r eo fa b o u tt h es a m es i z ef o r
income, inc, and the job destruction rate, jdr. The labor-force partic-
ipation rate, lf, is the only variable for which the ”between” variation
is larger than the ”within” variation, that is the variation between the
municipalities is larger than the variation over time.
The variables in the estimations are plotted in Figure 3-8. Box-Whiskers
plots of the data, converted into annual frequency, are used to present both
the time variation and the variation between the municipalities. The box
contains data between the 25th to 75th percentiles, and the line represents
the median.
IFAU–Do labor market ﬂows aﬀect labor-force participation? 33Table 6: Summary statistics of the variables in the estimation, 18-64 age
group
Variable Mean Sd dev Min Max
lf Overall 0.6469417 0.0342102 0.5046371 0.7524384
Between 0.0298625 0.5515411 0.7113511
Within 0.0167835 0.5455315 0.7155822
inc Overall 69.99863 9.06715 54.67853 170.6625
Between 6.450023 63.27419 123.2307
Within 6.384028 41.24669 117.4304
[u → r] Overall .0858124 0.0593489 0 1.162162
Between 0.0215451 0.0455565 0.1687584
Within 0.0553147 -0.082946 1.12007
[r → u] Overall 0.1575314 0.1092936 0 1.391304
Between 0.0182308 0.1100406 0.2295377
Within 0.1077678 -0.0720063 1.395341
teta Overall 0.051971 0.0753091 0 1.653846
Between 0.0336615 0.0117152 0.227007
Within 0.0673968 -0.1692889 1.518969
jdr Overall 0.0167328 0.0269813 0 0.4909314
Between 0.0028044 0.0101771 0.0364135
Within 0.0268357 -0.0141905 0.4928846
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Figure 5: Flow rate open unemployment to labor market programs
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Figure 7: Labor market tightness
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Figure 8: Job destruction rate
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Table 7: Estimated sums of coeﬃcients at lagged levels
Age group 18-64 18-64 men 18-64 women
Variable Coeﬀ p-val Coeﬀ p-val Coeﬀ p-val
lf -0.04710 0.000 -0.06274 0.000 -0.05089 0.000
inc 0.00002 0.101 0.00003 0.270 -0.00002 0.467
[u → r] 0.00446 0.003 0.00340 0.050 0.00634 0.000
[r → u] -0.00112 0.186 -0.00114 0.187 -0.00271 0.004
teta 0.00401 0.000 0.00236 0.000 0.00218 0.000
jdr -0.02124 0.265 -0.01667 0.459 -0.03884 0.055
R2 0.051 0.061 0.054
AR(1) 0.992 0.035 0.429
AR(2) 0.004 0.153 0.002
AR(3) 0.907 0.918 0.270
AR(4) 0.052 0.011 0.099
AR(5) 0.010 0.017 0.000
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In addition to the results for all labor force participants in the 18-64 age
range presented in the main text, models are also estimated for partic-
ipants in the 18-24, 25-39, 40-54, 55-64, 25-54, and 55-64 age groups.
Separate models are estimated for the older men and women.
Table 8: Estimated sums of coeﬃcients at lagged levels
Age group 18-24 25-39
Variable Coeﬀ p-val Coeﬀ p-val
lf -0.11062 0.000 -0.06382 0.000
inc 0.00029 0.002 0.00010 0.014
[u → r] 0.00350 0.084 0.00932 0.000
[r → u] 0.00600 0.571 -0.00391 0.001
teta 0.00106 0.000 0.00266 0.000






Tables 8-10 present the results for participants in the 18-24, 25-39, 40-
54, 25-54, and 55-64 age groups. Adjustment to the long run level is faster
for the youngest participants. The estimated sum of the coeﬃcients for
the lagged dependent variable for the youngest participants is 0.90, and
0.95 for the other age groups. The model for the older participants, in
the 55-64 age range, has most signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for the lagged levels
of the variables. There are some signs of correlations left in the residuals,
particularly for the older participants.
Tables 11-12 present the long run estimated eﬀects for the 18-24, 25-
39, 40-54, 25-54, and 55-64 age groups, together with p- v a l u e sf o rt e s t so f
the hypotheses that the estimated eﬀects are equal to zero and that they
are equal to the eﬀects for all participants in the 18-64 age range. The
estimated eﬀects of income are positive for all age groups, as expected,
and signiﬁcant, except for participants in the 25-54 age group. The eﬀect
of income for the 45-54 and 25-54 age groups are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from the eﬀect for the 18-64 age group. For participants between the ages
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Age group 40-54 25-54
Variable Coeﬀ p-val Coeﬀ p-val
lf -0.05643 0.000 -0.05525 0.000
inc 0.00003 0.066 0.00004 0.118
[u → r] 0.00360 0.049 0.00812 0.000
[r → u] -0.00082 0.283 -0.00319 0.001
teta 0.00147 0.000 0.00410 0.000






Table 10: Estimated sums of coeﬃcients for lagged levels
Age group 55-64 55-64 men 55-64 women
Variable Coeﬀ p-val Coeﬀ p-val Coeﬀ p-val
lf -0.04095 0.000 -0.05541 0.000 -0.04544 0.000
inc -0.00006 0.045 -0.00010 0.000 -0.00011 0.012
[u → r] 0.00313 0.076 0.00288 0.240 0.00431 0.013
[r → u] -0.00104 0.080 -0.00010 0.897 -0.00082 0.112
teta -0.00027 0.076 -0.00033 0.005 0.00006 0.333
jdr -0.01141 0.549 -0.01242 0.551 -0.02245 0.313
R2 0.029 0.036 0.030
AR(1) 0.158 0.701 0.214
AR(2) 0.008 0.027 0.183
AR(3) 0.002 0.000 0.007
AR(4) 0.006 0.004 0.058
AR(5) 0.018 0.024 0.000
of 18-24 and 25-39, the estimated eﬀects of income are greater than in
the other age groups, and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the eﬀect for all
participants in the 18-64 age range. The point estimates of income are
negative and signiﬁcant for the older participants. The expected eﬀect
is positive, and the point estimates are positive for the other age groups,
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age groups
Variable Eﬀect p-val p-val Eﬀect p-val p-val
eﬀect 18—24 = 0 = 18-64 25—39 = 0 = 18-64
inc 0.00265 0.002 0.007 0.00159 0.015 0.064
[u → r] 0.03164 0.085 0.001 0.14609 0.000 0.183
[r → u] 0.00542 0.572 0.002 -0.06121 0.001 0.043
teta 0.00956 0.000 0.000 0.04164 0.000 0.000
jdr -0.42084 0.386 0.950 -0.46358 0.113 0.964
eﬀect 40—54 = 0 = 18-64 25—54 = 0 = 18-64
inc 0.00049 0.065 0.699 0.00069 0.117 0.484
[u → r] 0.06387 0.049 0.340 0.14698 0.000 0.173
[r → u] -0.01446 0.284 0.493 -0.05779 0.001 0.058
teta 0.02611 0.000 0.000 0.07416 0.000 0.427
jdr -0.20606 0.554 0.480 -0.40530 0.182 0.888
except for female participants age range 18-64. Appendix D indicates that
low-income earners are over-represented among those who leave the labor
force. Moreover, the fraction leaving the labor force in this age-group
is non-trivial. This behavior introduces a negative correlation between
average income and the labor-force participation rate for older persons,
which shows up in the estimation results.
The estimated eﬀects of the ﬂow rate into labor-market programs,
[u → r], are positive as expected and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
The eﬀects of inﬂow rates, [u → r], are lower for the younger participants
of age 18-24, compared to the other age groups, and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
compared to all participants of age 18-64. The largest point estimates are
found for participants in the 25-39 and 25-54 age groups. The estimated
eﬀects of ﬂow rates from labor market programs into open unemployment,
[r → u], are negative as expected in all age groups, except for the younger
participants of the 16-24 age group. The eﬀect is not signiﬁcant for partici-
pants between the 16-24 and 40-54 age groups. The eﬀects for participants
who are 25-39 and 25-54 years old are more negative and signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from the eﬀects for all participants in the 18-64 age range. The
eﬀects from inﬂow are also larger for these age groups, indicating that
they are most sensitive to changes in the ﬂow rates in and out of labor-
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Variable Eﬀect p-val p-val p-val p-val
eﬀect 55-64 = 0 = 18-64
inc -0.00137 0.045 0.010
[u → r] 0.07641 0.076 0.671
[r → u] -0.02548 0.080 0.888
teta -0.00646 0.076 0.000
jdr -0.27857 0.549 0.708
men 55-64m = 0 = 18-64 = 55-64 = women
inc -0.00182 0.000 0.000 0.340 0.262
[u → r] 0.05203 0.240 0.334 0.584 0.332
[r → u] -0.00174 0.888 0.102 0.077 0.225
teta -0.00587 0.005 0.000 0.777 0.029
jdr -0.22419 0.549 0.549 0.886 0.471
women 55-64w = 0 = 18-64 = 55-64 = men
inc -0.00235 0.012 0.003 0.292 0.572
[u → r] 0.09489 0.013 1.000 0.632 0.264
[r → u] -0.01804 0.112 0.617 0.512 0.150
teta 0.00130 0.332 0.000 0.000 0.000
jdr -0.49412 0.313 0.920 0.663 0.584
market programs. For the older participants, the estimated eﬀects of the
ﬂow rates to and from labor market programs, [u → r]a n d[ r → u], have
the expected positive and negative signs, respectively, and they are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the estimated eﬀects for all participants.
The estimated eﬀects of teta, labor market tightness are positive, as
expected, and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The estimated eﬀects of
teta are, except for the 25-54 age group, signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the
eﬀects for all participants in the 18-64 age range. Labor-market tightness
is measured as the total number of vacancies divided by the number of
job-searchers in each age group, so the estimated coeﬃcient measures the
eﬀect of competition for the vacant jobs within the same age group. For the
older participants, the estimated eﬀects of teta are signiﬁcantly negative
for men, and for men and women together. The point estimate for women
is positive as expected, but not signiﬁcant. A negative eﬀect of labor
market tightness, teta, implies that more people will leave labor force
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are discussed in Appendix D. It turns out that it is the same factor as for
the eﬀect of income - that older participants tend to leave labor force to
a larger extend than other participants.
The eﬀects of the job destruction rate, jdr, are negative as expected.
These eﬀects are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero or from the eﬀect
for all participants in the 18-64 age range. As discussed in Section 4.2,
the job destruction rate is an imperfect measure of negative employment
shocks, which could be a reason for the imprecise estimates. For the older
participants the estimated eﬀects of the job destruction rate, jdr,a r en e g -
ative and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. They are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from the estimated eﬀect on all participants in the 18-64 age
range.
Table 13: P-values for joint tests of long-run eﬀects of programs and all
long-run eﬀects
Joint test Joint test
[u → r] and [r → u] All long run eﬀects
Age groups eﬀ =0 e ﬀ =1 8 - 6 4 e ﬀ=0 eﬀ=18-64
18-24 0.198 0.000 0.000 0.000
25-39 0.000 0.090 0.000 0.000
40-54 0.114 0.563 0.000 0.000
25-54 0.000 0.116 0.000 0.413
55-64 0.078 0.891 0.003 0.000
55-64 m 0.497 0.220 0.000 0.000
55-64 w 0.023 0.878 0.011 0.000
Table 13 presents the p-values from Wald tests of the hypothesis that
the ﬂow rates from unemployment to programs, [u → r] and from pro-
grams to unemployment, [u → r]a r ej o i n t l ys i g n i ﬁcant. Tests of the joint
signiﬁcance of the long run eﬀect of all variables are also presented, to-
gether with the results of tests of the hypothesis that the joint eﬀects diﬀer
from the eﬀects for all participants in the 18-64 age range.
The joint eﬀect of the ﬂow rates into and out of labor market programs,
[u → r], [r − u], are signiﬁcant for the groups in the 25-39 and 25-54 age
range, and insigniﬁcant for the 18-24 and 40-54 age groups. The eﬀects
for the 40-54 and 25-54 age groups are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
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are jointly signiﬁcant and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the eﬀects for all
participants, except for participants in the 25-54 age range. For the male
older participants, the point estimates are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
the joint estimates, except for the smaller eﬀect of the outﬂow rate from
programs, [r → u]. The estimated eﬀects for men and women are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other except for the eﬀect of teta, labor
market tightness, as discussed above.
To summarize, in general, the eﬀects for the youngest participants are
diﬀerent from the estimated eﬀects for the other age groups. The ad-
justment time is shorter, the eﬀect of income larger, with smaller eﬀects
of ﬂow rates to and from labor market programs, and the eﬀect of la-
bor market tightness is smaller. The labor-force participation decision is
probably very diﬀerent for participants in the diﬀerent age-groups. Among
the younger participants in the 18-24 age group, the main alternative to
labor-force participation is probably to be a student. Other important
factors, speciﬁcally for the 18-24 and 25-39 age-groups, are establishing a
family and childbirth. Still, the overall impression is that the estimation
results are much more similar than might be expected when the diﬀerent
situations for participants in diﬀerent age-groups are taken into account.
The main reason underlying the strange eﬀects of income and labor
market tightness for older participants is that they tend to leave labor
force to a larger extent than participants in the other age-groups. This is
true both for employed and unemployed, see the discussion in Appendix
D.
D Discussion of the estimation results for the
older participants
Some of the results for the older participants in the 55-64 age group, are
odd - the parameters are precisely estimated, but the sign is the opposite
of the expected. Adverse eﬀects are found for income and labor market
tightness. Tightness is the number of vacancies divided by the number
of searchers, a measure that should indicate whether it is diﬃcult or easy
to ﬁnd a job. Both variables are expected to have positive eﬀects on the
labor-force participation rate, but the estimated eﬀects are often negative
and signiﬁcant. This section attempts to discuss possible explanations
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informally look for indications of what factors that might underlie the
estimation results.
D.1 Income
The estimated eﬀects of income are negative and signiﬁcant for all older
participants, and for men and women separately. A large positive in-
come eﬀect relative to negative substitution eﬀects as in an ordinary labor
supply model cannot not explain the results, because here, labor-force par-
ticipation is measured in terms of the number of persons and not in hours.
Income is measured as average income for employed persons, and the par-
ticipation rate is the number of employed, unemployed and participants
in programs, divided by the number of older persons in the population.
A spurious negative correlation could be introduced if average income in-
creases due to reduced employment, and if those leaving employment also
leave the labor force. The eﬀect will be more pronounced if people who
leave labor force have a smaller income than average. To be a candidate
for an explanation, the eﬀects have to be more important for the older
participants than for participants in other age groups.
Table 14: Share of individuals employed for at least one month in year,
t=0 and not employed for at least one month year, t=1
year 1990-91 1991-92 1995-96
age group %%%
40-54 6.3 6.9 4.9
55-64 11.8 14.2 8.1
Table 15: Share of the individuals above registered as job-seekers in year
t=0 or t=1
year 1990-91 1991-92 1995-96
age group %%%
40-54 27.8 40.9 48.0
55-64 12.5 17.4 25.3
Individuals who are 40-54 and 55-64 years old, and employed for at
least one month in t = 0, in the years 1990, 1991 or 1995 and not employed
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out from the new database, described in Section 3.1. The average income
in these groups is lower than the average income for all employed persons
in the same age group.29 The share of employed persons in these groups
is larger among the older participants - between 8-14 percent, compared
with 5-7 percent among participants in the 40-54 age group, see Table 10.
The results indicate that the income for those who leave employment is
lower than average and older participants tend to leave employment more
frequently than the 40-54 age group.
If individuals in these groups (who leave employment) also leave the
labor force, they should not be registered as unemployed or as participants
in a labor market program in the H¨ andel-register. The proportion of
individuals in the investigated groups that are registered in H¨ andel in any
of the two years, is 13 to 25 percent for the older category, and 30 to 48
percent for the middle aged, see Table 15. In other word, the share of
individuals in the investigated groups that have probably left labor force
is around 75 to 87 percent for the older category, and 52 to 70 percent for
the middle aged.
Data indicates that older participants who leave employment tend to
leave the labor force to a larger extent than middle-aged participants. Em-
ployed persons with below-average income that tend to leave employment.
The fact that older participants leave labor force to a larger extent than
the middle aged could be behind the negative correlations between income
and the labor-force participation rate.
D.2 Labor market tightness
The estimated eﬀects of teta, labor market tightness, are signiﬁcantly neg-
ative for men, and for men and women in combination. The point estimate
for women is positive, as expected, but insigniﬁcant. A negative eﬀect of
labor market tightness implies that more people will leave the labor force
when it is easy to ﬁnd a job. Labor market tightness is measured as the
number of vacancies divided by the number of job-searchers in the age
29The average income in 1990, 1991 or 1995 for older persons in this group was 10
998, 12 223, and 15 659. On average, the income for older employed was in 1990, 1991
or 1995 14 193, 15 213, and 18 205. The average income for 40-54 years old was 11 178,
12 547, and 15430, for the group who have left employment for at least one month in
t +1 . For those employed in t =0 , the average income was 14 984, 16 076, and 18 805,
respectively.
IFAU–Do labor market ﬂows aﬀect labor-force participation? 49group. The estimated coeﬃcient measures the eﬀect of competition for
the vacant jobs that take place within the same age group.
One explanation for the contra-intuitive results could be the same
mechanism as for the eﬀect of income. If older people who are registered as
job-searchers in H¨ andel leave the labor force, labor market tightness will
increase and the labor-force participation rate will decrease, introducing
a negative correlation between tightness and the labor-force participation
rate.
Other candidates for explanations are probably not so important. In-
creased mortality reduces the number of searchers, and increases labor
market tightness. The way in which the participation rate is aﬀected
depends on the relative eﬀect of mortality on participants and nonpartici-
pants in the labor force. The use of labor market programs whose purpose
is to make it easier for older people to leave the labor force, might be an
explanation of the pattern observed in data, especially if they are used
when it is relatively easy to ﬁnd a job. Two such programs30 were intro-
duced around 1998, after a period of extremely high unemployment rates.
The eﬀect of these programs during the sample period is, however, oﬀset
by the introduction of programs whose purpose is the opposite, to increase
the possibility of getting a job among older job-searchers.31 Programs di-
rected at older participant are therefore not one of the main factors behind
the adverse estimation results.
Table 16: Share of persons registered as job-seekers in t=0, and not in
t=1, who have a statement of income in t=0 or t=1
year 1992 1993 1995 1996 1998 1999 average
age group t =0 t =1 t =0 t =1 t =0 t =1 t =0 t =1
45-54 89 79 79 74 77 75 82 76
55-64 85 61 70 54 69 55 75 57
Job-seekers in the 55-64 and 40-54 age groups, and registered in H¨ andel
30”Generationsv¨ axlingen” where employed persons that are older than 63 years old,
c a ni ft h ee m p l o y e rp e r m i t si t ,r e t i r e .T h ev a c a n tj o bs h o u l db er e p l a c e db yal o n g - t e r m
unemployed in the 20-34 age group. Applications were allowed between January and
August 1998. ”Tillf¨ allig avg˚ angsers¨ attning”, between 1997-07 to 1998-12, permits older
unemployed persons registered at an employment oﬃce to leave labor force.
31Public temporary work (OTA, Oﬀentliga tillf¨ alliga arbeten) between 1997-2001 and
Special recruitment incentive (S¨ arskilt anst¨ allningsst¨ od) from November 2000.
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t=1, who are registered as employed for at least one month in t=0 or t=1
year 1992 1993 1995 1996 1998 1999 average
age group t =0 t =1 t =0 t =1 t =0 t =1 t =0 t =1
45-54 57 48 47 48 48 52 51 49
55-64 51 26 34 25 39 28 41 26
during 1992, 1995 or 1998, were picked out from H¨ andel for furher investi-
gation if older job-seekers leave labor force to a greater extent than other
job-seekers. If they do, this could result in a negative correlation between
tightness and the labor-force participation rate. The job-seekers should
be registered in H¨ andel during 1992, 1995 or 1998, t =0 , and they are
not allowed to be registered in H¨ andel the following year, 1993, 1996 or
1999, t = 0. On average, 63% of the older, and 49% of the middle-aged
job-seekers in t = 0 are not registered as job-seekers in t =1 .
I ft h o s ew h ol e a v eH ¨ andel could not be found in the employment reg-
ister, it is an indication that they have left labor force. On average, 75%
of the older and 82% of the middle-aged job seekers have a statement of
income in the same year as they are recorded as job-seekers. The year
after, on average 57% of the older and 76% of the middle-aged job seekers
have a statement of income, see Table 12. The share of job-seekers with
no statement of income in either of the two years is 34% for the older
group and 21% for persons in the 40-54 age group. If, instead, we look at
employment, the share of job-seekers registered as employed for at least
one month is larger for the 40-54 age group compared to the 55-64 age
group. The proportion decline between the ﬁr s ta n dt h es e c o n dy e a rf o r
the older age group, and is approximately the same for job-seekers in the
40-54 age group, indicating that older participants tend to leave labor
force to a greater extent than the middle-aged.
To summarize, older job-seekers seem to leave labor force to a greater
extent than job-seekers that are 40-54 years old. This could explain the
negative correlation between tightness and labor-force participation rate
in the estimation.
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